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CASE NOTES
plaintiff comes under great pressure to settle 2 6 The great consumption of
time in a derivative suit and the prospect of losing all if the case is litigated
on the merits frequently leaves the plaintiff-shareholder with little choice
but to settle. Recovery by corporations in New York court settlements
amounts on the average to three per cent of the amount sued for." The un-
representative nature of derivative suits severely undercuts the theory of the
majority's opinion in the noted case. Because the corporate interest must be
represented, and because the ordinary derivative suit does not fulfill the task,
the burden of sustaining the corporate welfare logically should devolve upon
the director. By requiring the director to observe the standard of full and
frank disclosure during litigation, derivative suits would be made more effec-
tive, because a director's ability to control litigation and to effect an outcome
favorable to himself would be lessened considerably.
In summary, because of the lack of precedent bearing on this issue,
the courts will have to weigh the two contrary viewpoints on the director's
duties during derivative suits. Balanced against the threat to the finality of
judgments is a desirable strengthening of the stockholder's position in
derivative suits. Although imposition of this duty may not produce immediate
compliance by wrongdoing directors, the remedies of stockholders will not
be cut off by an adverse decision. If a director withholds material evidence
of his wrongdoing, it will constitute a breach of duty and provide the stock-
holder with the procedural means of overturning an unjust decision favoring
the wrongdoer. The adoption of this new duty seems clearly in line with the
trend in case law toward a higher standard of loyalty of directors to their
corporation and stockholders.
JOHN A. DONOVAN
Damages—Income Taxes—Compensation Basis for Wrongful Death
Act.—Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S.'—While unloading
cargo, a longshoreman was killed by a falling hatch boom on defendant's
vessel which was moored in New York territorial waters. His administratrix
brought this admiralty action in the United States Court for the Southern
District of New Yorke to recover her damages as the wife-beneficiary under
the New York wrongful death act. 3 Finding defendant's equipment un-
seaworthy, the trial court was required to compute fair and just compensa-
tion for the pecuniary injuries to the wife as a result of the wrongful death.
213 Report of the SEC on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Per-
sonnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, 675-76 (1937), pt. 1.
27 Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse—Present and Future, 41
Colum. L. Rev. 405, 426 (1941).
1 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 Although the longshoreman's widow did not qualify for the admiralty provisions
of the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958),
admiralty in personam remedies which follow New York law were available on account
of death within the territorial waters of that state. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S.
588 (1959); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
3 N,Y. Decedent Estate Law §§ 130-35.
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The court estimated the amount of decedent's future earnings, which were
in the lower income range, and then deducted future federal and state in-
come taxes. The only issues on appeal concerned the method of computation
of damages, and the primary question was whether decedent's gross earn-
ings or his net earnings after taxes should be the basis of compensation'
On appeal, reversing and remanding for recomputation of damages, the
Second Circuit HELD: In the absence of New York law to the contrary,
the federal court should use the gross income measure of damages because
of the speculative nature of any deduction for future income taxes .8
Historically, English law punished misconduct leading to personal in-
jury because it threatened the maintenance of public order—the foremost
governmental concern of an emerging society .° Monetary penalties for crimes
and torts alike satisfied compensatory, punitive, and vindictive instincts of
the freemen and the king. A man's wer, the compensation for his life, was
derived from his position in the social hierarchy, but the compensation for
personal injury followed a graded schedule according to the degree of
physical harm- 7
 Both death and personal injury were amendable by payment
of the pre-ordained fines.8
 When wilful homicide became punishable by
death during the thirteenth century, neither wer nor compensation of any
sort accrued to the kindred of the slain.° Six centuries intervened before
4 The trial court also included in its award a sum designed to take into account the
future income taxes of the widow on the income payable as a result of investment of
the award.
5
 The trial court decision was affirmed, however, with respect to all other questions
raised by the parties, but the recomputation must omit the sum mentioned supra note 4.
0
 2 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law 449 (2d ed. 1898).
7 See Stephenson & Marcham, Sources of English Constitutional History 3-4 (1937),
quoting the dooms of King Aethelberht (601-04):
If a man slays another, he shall pay as compensation (to the kindred) the
ordinary wergeld . . of 100s. . . .
. Here follows in the doom an elaborate schedule of compensations for minor
injuries: e.g., an ear, 12s.; an eye, 50s.; the chin-bone, 20s.; a front tooth, 6s.;
a thumb, 20s.; a forefinger, 9s.; a fingernail, Is.; a big toe, 10s.
King Alfred (871-904) perceived a standard of care and the possibility of accident
in his wrongful death act:
A man carrying a spear should carry it level on his shoulder in order to be
free from blame if another runs upon the point. If the point is three'fingers or
more above the butt (so as to bring the point to the level of a man's face),
he will be liable to pay wer [to the kindred) in case of a fatal accident, and
all the more if the point were in front (so that he could have seen the other's
danger).
See 1 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 6, at 53-54.
8
 But fines were often unpaid, because of their size. In lieu of the tariffs, the
penalties included enslavement of the malefactor, his outlawry by society, or resort to
blood-feud by .kin of the injured. Earlier punishment to life and limb persisted for
certain wrongs. See 1 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 6, at 46-49, and 2 Pollock &
Maitland, supra note 6, at 456-62.
0 2 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 6, at 459-60. How this rule became a part of
the common law is the topic of Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton,
32 L.Q. Rev. 431 (1916).
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Lord Campbell's Act" in England and similar wrongful death acts" in
the United States finally again provided for compensation to surviving kin.
Thereafter, the statutory provisions and the compatible common law con-
trolled these remedial actions."
The New York wrongful death act, like similar acts in several states,
awards "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting from
the decedent's death, to the person . . . for whose benefit the action is
brought."" Courts consider several variables in determining damages for
pecuniary injuries" under compensatory" wrongful death acts. Chief
among these variables are:"
(I) decedent's lost potential earnings and pension benefits;
(2) value of services, instruction and guidance to the beneficiary,
had decedent lived;
(3) decedent's potential income taxes, personal expenses and other
self-directed expenditures;
(4) estate taxes payable on the award; 17
(5) yield after beneficiary's taxes from the investment of the declining
balance of the award;" and
(6) all litigation costs.
Several federal analogies to state wrongful death acts have led to
damage actions in the federal courts. In some of these cases, fair and just
compensation has been reached without a discussion of the income tax issue
or each other variable, even though the award turned out to be vastly less
than the product of decedent's past annual earnings and life expectancy.
10 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
11
 New York Laws of 1847, ch. 450, was the first, according to Tiffany, Death by
Wrongful Act, § 19 (2d ed. 1913).
12
 For instance, the common law principle of a single lump sum judgment presents
to the courts the comprehensive problem of forecasting at once the amount of any con-
tinuing damage. Whether the principle satisfies plaintiff's needs for compensation as they
occur is questioned in 2 Harper Sr James, Torts § 25.2 (1956).
18 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 132.
14 Some states allow recovery for beneficiary's lost companionship, affection and
protection. See Morris' Adm'rx v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 107 W.Va. 97, 147 S.E. 547
(1929).
16 Some state statutes, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229 (Supp. 1963),
provide punitive damages instead of, or in addition to, compensatory damages.
16 For a more extensive set of variables than those corresponding to the facts and
controlling death act present in the instant case, see Anderson, A Model State Wrongful
Death Act, 1 Harv. J. Leg. 28 (1964).
17 Awards which go to the beneficiary without passing through decedent's estate
are not subject to federal estate tax. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179. Quaere,
whether awards distributed through decedent's estate which are subject to claims of
decedent's creditors are also free of federal estate tax.
18 The beneficiary is not liable for federal income tax on the award itself because
the compensation is viewed as a return of capital "to restore [the recipient] .. . to
substantially the same financial and economic status as she possessed prior to the death
of her husband." I.T. 2420, VII-2 Cum. Bull. 123 (1928), cited in United States v.
Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 319 (1960). See also the extensive discussion in Morris & Nordstrom,
Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960).
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Thus, in Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.," the hazards of decedent's new
entrepreneurial venture and the uncertainties of his health and other con-
tingencies caused the court to be silent about what annual compensation
formed the basis of the award. Decedent's earnings in the five years im-
mediately prior to death increased irregularly from $35,000 to $108,000,
averaging $70,000, but the award was consistent with an annual compen-
sation of about $42,000. Very simple facts also may spare a court the need
to consider explicitly the income tax variable. For example, in United States
v. Smith,2° decedent's parents were compensated for money he had been
sending them out of his earnings. The court computed an award by using
just the highest past remittance, life expectancies and investment yield.
In McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 21
 where plaintiff, an-
nually earning $4,800, alleged permanent and total disability, the Second
Circuit considered the tax variable and affirmed use of the gross income
measure. Stokes v. United States,22
 holding that income taxes were too
speculative to consider in a personal injury action involving temporary and
partial disability, was cited as controlling. The McWeeney court found
the higher award resulting from the gross income rule to be fair, except
possibly where high incomes are involved, because of failure to include any-
thing in the award otherwise for inflation and plaintiff's attorneys' fees.
Tax considerations were deemed improper to consider because of the un-
certainties of tax law changes and the number of plaintiff's future dependents
and because of the computational difficulties in maintaining consistency by
crediting income taxes on yield from the award.23
Although Stokes and McWeeney did not deal with compensation for
death,24
 they governed a wrongful death action in Montellier v. United
States,25
 where again use of the' gross income measure was affirmed. Since
McWeeney recognized a possible exception where high incomes are involved,
the Montellier court declared:
It would not have been erroneous under the rule of McWeeney . .
for the trial judge to have made a deduction for income taxes,
which would have amounted to a substantial sum in this case.
10 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963). Controlling was the Death on the High Seas
Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958).
20
 220 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1955). Controlling was the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915),
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). Accord, Lange v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 777
(N.D.N.Y. 1960). Controlling was the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
2671-80 (1958).
21
 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). Controlling was the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1958).
22 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
23 Compare, however, the clarity of the mathematical approach to the last problem
via an adjustment in the discount rate in 22 Ohio St. L.J. 225, 227 (1961).
24 Some of the uncertainties of compensation for disability are not relevant to com-
pensation for death. See Wright, Foreword to Symposium on Damages for Personal
Injuries, 19 Ohio St. L.j. 155, 157 (1958).
25 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963). The Federal Tort Claims Act; 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1958), provides a federal measure of compensatory damages where none are provided
by the state's wrongful death act.
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However, [decedent's $12,000 annual] earnings were not so clearly
above the "middle reach of the income scale" that it was erroneous
not to make such a deduction. As we indicated in McWeeney,
no precise line can be drawn.25
State courts which have considered the question in wrongful death or
personal injury actions have also established the gross income measure,
rather than the net, as supported by "the weight of authority."27 Texas,
for example, has excluded any mention of income taxes as a matter of "legal
principle."23
 Pennsylvania has adopted the gross income measure because
it is the "majority rule" and the product of "sound legal reasoning. P)20
Floyd v. Fruit Indus. Inc.," was the first decisive break from the gross
income rule in this country. 3 ' The Connecticut court treated the high in-
come bracket of the decedent as a signal to recognize that the only usable
earnings are those included in net income. Floyd held that the tax factor
was no more uncertain, speculative or conjectural than many of the other
variables which must be considered by the jury according to Connecticut
precedent.82
Oklahoma, in the wrongful death action of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Sutton," has used the net income basis in order to avoid giving the plain-
tiff more than her husband would ever have contributed for her needs or
wants. The decision determined the Oklahoma law which the court in
O'Connor v. United States" was bound to apply in a death action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 35
 The authority was congenial as well as
controlling, for the O'Connor court also felt that the compensatory nature
of the right to damages under the Tort Claims Act required computation of
decedent's future income after taxes. It was deemed unrealistic to suppose
taxes will be discontinued or reduced substantially. The holding was clari-
26 Montellier v. United States, supra note 25, at 186.
27 Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516, 532 (D. Md. 1959). The federal
court determined that the gross income measure should be used in a wrongful death action
which applied Maryland law under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
28
 Texas Consol. Transp. Co. v. Eubanks, 340 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Tex. Civ. APP.
1960).
22 Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 530, 538,
190 A.2d 293, 298 (1963).
30 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957), construing the Connecticut wrongful death
act, Conn. Gen. Stat. tit. 52 § 52-555 (1958). Exemplary damages up to the costs of
litigation are permitted. Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn. 565, 41 A.2d 449 (1945).
31 Just one year before, English precedent had been reversed and the net income
measure used in a partial disability personal injury action where high income tax rates
were involved. British Transp. Comm. v. Gourley, [1956] 2 Weekly L.R. 41 (ILL.).
The net income measure is used in death actions; see, e.g., Daniels v. Jones, [1961] 1
Weekly L.R. 1103 (C.A.). In English actions plaintiffs receive a more liberal measure
of costs than in this country. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849 (1929).
32
 Floyd v. Fruit Indus. Inc., supra note 30, 144 Conn. 659, 672, 136 A.2d 918, 925.
Cited was an earlier wrongful death action, Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 161 Ad. 239
(1932).
33 208 Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953), applying 12 Okla. Stat. 1053-54 (1951).
34 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959).
35 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1958).
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fled in the instant case, however, and limited to an application of Oklahoma
law.8°
In a rehearing which reduced the award of Meehan v. Central R.R.
Co.,87 the New Jersey wrongful death act88 was found to be silent about
deduction of income taxes. The net income measure was used and credit
was given for taxes on the anticipated yield on the award. Decedent's gross
earnings were $11,500. Because of its failure to recognize that the use of
net income in O'Connor was based on Oklahoma law rather than general
compensatory principles, the reasoning in Meehan appears to have been
rejected in the instant case.
In Rogow v. United States, 39 where decedent had annual income of
$23,600, the New York wrongful death act 4° was not found to be silent nor
a barrier to the net income basis. The following definition of fair and just
compensation under New York law was the authority for deducting taxes:
The main elements to be considered are the age of the decedent, his
health, habits, qualities, expectation of life and expectation in life,
earning ability, income, the prospect of increase of income, the
number, age, sex, situation, and condition of those dependent on
him for support, and his disposition to support them well or other-
wise, and the like. . . . [Title precise question is: What were the
probable chances of pecuniary benefit from the continuance in life
of the decedent worth under all circumstances? 41
Despite the apparent conflict with Rogow's reading of New York law,
the instant case reaches a practical result which is more justly compensatory
to the beneficiary in the eyes of the Second Circuit than if income taxes were
deducted. 42
 The court emphasized that inflation and attorneys' fees—neither
of which were included in the trial court's determination of the award—
would be' quite as real to the beneficiary as her freedom from taxes on the
award. The court would perhaps have been a "bit more generous" to the
beneficiary than the trier of fact's The result sets off these variables against
each other by leaving all of them out of the recomputation of damages.
The instant case illustrates that the choice between gross and net income
measures is not always critical to the principle of compensation, if the courts
regulate their view of other variables according to how they handle income
38 Supra note 1, at 315.
37
 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
38
 N.J.S.A. 2A: 31-1 to 2A: 31-6 (1952).
39
 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
40 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law H 130-35.
4t Arnold v. State, 163 App. Div. 253, 264, 148 N.Y.S. 479, 486 (1914). See also
Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (ND. Cal. 1964), which analyzed California
law analogously to use the net income measure where decedent's income was $10,500.
42 In a future case like Rogow where state law does not expressly compel the use of
the gross income measure at all levels of earnings, the McWeeney exception would seem
to allow income taxes to be deducted, if the court finds income to be high enough.
43 Supra note 1, at 312.
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taxes. An unfortunate result of the emphasis in the Second Circuit on its
qualified gross income rule, however, is the picture it may present of casual
handling by the courts of other difficult and important compensatory vari-
ables when they are considered in combination with the income tax question."
SAMUEL E. SHAW II
Government Contracts—"Team" Projects—Prime Contractor's Relation
to Subcontractor—Joint Enterprise.—Air Technology Corp. v. General
Elec. Co.'--In 1961 General Electric (GE) began preparing a proposal to
the Air Force for the establishment of a nuclear detection system. Represen-
tatives of GE and Air Technology (AT), discussed the possibility of GE in-
corporating AT's design of the EM sensor subsystem 2 in a "team" proposal
to the Air Force if AT could demonstrate that Air Force accuracy require-
ments had been met. For "team" membership, GE required that AT (1)
justify to GE the scientific basis for its EM sensor design, (2) assist in pre-
paring and presenting the proposal to the Air Force, and (3) submit, at GE's
request, a properly priced proposal for the EM sensor subsystem. AT ful-
filled its first requirement without imposing proprietary restrictions on the
included data. At about this time, GE informed the Air Force that AT was a
"team member" and subcontractor of GE's. GE then submitted its proposal
to the Air Force including material contained in AT's proposal to it. Subse-
quently, AT fulfilled its second team membership requirement by assisting
GE in orally presenting its proposal to the Air Force. The Air Force then
selected GE as prime contractor, provided a suitable contract could be nego-
tiated. GE was not selected on the basis of its proposal, which was not
completely acceptable technically, but rather on a statement of its expected
performance. During negotiations with the Air Force, AT informed GE
that it " 'expected a sole source procurement from GE on the EM sensor.' "3
GE, however, after successfully negotiating the prime contract, solicited
competitive bids for the EM sensor from a number of companies including
AT, and ultimately decided to build part of the EM subsystem itself. AT
brought this bill in equity to restrain GE from using sensor information
44 Compare the technique used effectively in Nollenberger v. United Air Lines Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963), where eleven special interrogatories allowed the
court to compute the award as the sum of five items (of several steps each), under the
provisions of Rule 49(b), F.R. Civ. P. The variables of income taxes on earnings and on
yield from the award and inflation were included explicitly.
1 1964 Mass, Adv. Sh. 949, 199 N,E,2d 538 (1964).
2
 Nuclear explosions generate various types of radiated effects, including optical,
acoustical, seismic and electromagnetic; measurement of the different effects is accom-
plished by means of sensing devices called "sensors," optical radiation being measured by
optical sensors, and electromagnetic radiation by electromagnetic (EM) sensors. The
contract finally awarded by the Air Force to GE stipulated the use of EM sensors and
required that they be capable of determining the direction and measuring the yield, or
magnitude, of nuclear detonations.
8 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 954, 199 N.E.2d, at
543.
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